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ABSTRACT 
 This paper focuses on the effects of nonbinding recommendations on bargaining 
outcomes.  Recommendations are theorized to have two effects:  they can create a focal point for 
final bargaining positions, and they can decrease outcome uncertainty should dispute persist.  
While the focal point effect may help lower dispute rates, the uncertainty reduction effect is 
predicted to do the opposite for risk-averse bargainers.  Which of these effects dominates is of 
critical importance in the optimal design of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) procedures, 
which are becoming increasingly utilized to help resolve disputes in a variety of settings.  We 
theoretically examine the effects of recommendations on the bargaining contract zone.  Our 
theoretical framework, which allows bargainers’ final positions to influence a binding outcome 
should negotiations fail, provides for a more stringent test of focal points than previously 
considered.  We also present data from controlled laboratory bargaining experiments that are 
consistent with our model of recommendation effects.  Recommendations are empirically shown 
to influence final bargaining positions and negotiated settlement values.  Furthermore, dispute 
rates are significantly lower when one includes recommendations, even where the 
recommendation is completely ignored in final-stage arbitration.  This highlights a potentially 
significant role for the use of nonbinding procedures, such as mediation, as a preliminary stage in 
developing more efficient ADR procedures. 
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1.  Introduction   
A significant institutional trend of the last 20-30 years has been the increased emphasis 
on alternative dispute resolution (ADR) programs, such as arbitration and mediation, to help 
resolve disputes.  ADR programs currently operate in a wide variety of contexts that include, 
among others, union-management negotiations, commercial contract disputes, divorce 
negotiations, college campus conflict, and civil/community (neighborhood) disputes.  In the 
U.S., community mediation programs are estimated to have almost 20,000 active volunteer 
community mediators nationwide in programs that now receive over 97,000 annual case 
referrals.1  Though only available in about 15% of U.S. colleges, campus mediation programs 
experienced a ten-fold increase during the 1990s (from around 20 to over 200).2  Tort reform in 
several states has included implementing court-annexed ADR procedures prior to litigation.  
Also, the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS)—an independent U.S. 
government agency created to promote labor-management peace—has an annual mediation 
intake of nearly 40,000 cases and receives nearly 20,000 annual arbitration panel requests.3   
In short, the volume of its use now makes ADR a significant institution in the U.S., not to 
mention elsewhere, and the trend towards increased ADR use appears persistent.  Any 
improvements in ADR institutional design could significantly reduce dispute costs and promote 
improved bargaining relationships, which are likely to further reduce dispute rates.  An 
examination of the key characteristics of different ADR procedures is necessary in order to 
design the most effective dispute settlement institutions. 
                                                 
1 Statistics are from the National Association for Community Mediation (NAFCM), and are available at the NAFCM 
website at www.nafcm.org.  
2 Data reported can be found on www.campus-adr.org, funded in part by a grant from the federal Fund for the 
Improvement of Postsecondary Education (FIPSE). 
3 Data is from the annual reports available on the FMCS website at www.fmcs.gov. 
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An ADR procedure can be generally classified as binding (e.g., litigation or arbitration) 
or nonbinding (e.g., mediation).  Binding procedures guarantee a settlement, but nonbinding 
procedures allow the bargainers to retain more control over the settlement, which increases 
bargainer satisfaction with the outcome.  Some procedures are hybrids, where a nonbinding 
procedure is utilized initially, and then a binding procedure follows if needed.  This is the case, 
for example, with court-annexed ADR that might compel the use of mediation prior to litigation.4  
There is a general consensus that bargainers typically prefer mediation to binding arbitration or 
litigation, but it is unclear whether settlement rates are uniformly higher under mediation.  In 
naturally occurring bargaining data, only the most serious disputes are handled with a binding 
procedure.  The resultant sample selection implies that comparing settlement rates from field 
data across various ADR procedures cannot identify the most effective procedure for settling 
comparable disputes.  Because it is often difficult to quantify factors that make one dispute more 
serious than another, econometric tools used to address sample selection are at a disadvantage.   
 This paper focuses on the use of nonbinding recommendations to improve binding 
dispute settlement procedures (e.g. arbitration, litigation, or legislation) in a controlled 
bargaining environment.  A nonbinding recommendation has two potential effects on bargainers.  
First, through its influence on bargainer beliefs, a recommendation may serve as a focal point 
(see Schelling, 1957), thereby helping to reduce the multiplicity of potential bargaining outcomes 
and improving the chance of voluntary settlement.  That is, bargainers’ expectations of what is 
considered a “fair” outcome may converge upon the recommendation, which can help eliminate 
                                                 
4 For example, Wisconsin arbitrators for public sector labor disputes first mediate the cases, and they only use 
arbitration in the event that mediation fails (see Babcock and Taylor, 1996).  Also, Hebdon (2001) notes that New 
York state public policy allows certain disputes to utilize a formal fact-finder recommendation, which is nonbinding, 
prior to implementation of a legislated (binding) settlement.  As another example, many counties in Utah and North 
Carolina now require that divorce and custody cases be mediated before they proceed to trial. 
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bargainer optimism that is likely to otherwise increase dispute rates (Babcock and Loewenstein, 
1997).  On the other hand, a recommendation may reduce uncertainty surrounding the likely 
outcome from litigation or arbitration, thereby increasing dispute rates for risk-averse bargainers 
(see Farber and Katz, 1979).  Which of these two effects dominates is of critical importance in 
evaluating whether nonbinding ADR improves bargaining effectiveness.  The initial results in 
Dickinson and Hunnicutt (2005) indicate that the focal point effect likely dominates the 
uncertainty effect.  However, the present paper contributes to this literature in several ways.  
First, Dickinson and Hunnicutt (2005) did not formally model a focal point, which we do as a 
sort of Bayesian updating process with respect to bargainer expectations.  Final bargaining 
positions are examined, in addition to dispute rates, in assessing the effects of suggestions.  We 
also include a treatment with a zero-weighted recommendation (i.e., =0), which allows for a 
much cleaner and direct test of the focal nature of the recommendation.  Finally, we compare a 
no-arbitration (NA) treatment, where the pie is destroyed with certainty at impasse, and a NA-
suggestion treatment, which together allow us to examine whether suggestions work via the 
hypothesized expectations revision or via simple psychological anchoring (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1974).  Lower dispute rates in NA-suggestion compared to NA is consistent only 
with the anchoring hypothesis, because there is no expectation of (the non-existent) arbitrator 
preferences to revise.   
 Our approach includes both theory and data from controlled laboratory bargaining 
experiments that generally support the hypothesized beneficial effects of recommendations:  
lower dispute rates and convergent final offers.  Lower dispute rates reduce the need to invoke a 
binding settlement procedure, and convergent final offers lead to less variable (i.e., more 
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acceptable) outcomes in the event that binding ADR is needed.5  Overall, the data also indicate 
that suggestions work not because of simple psychological anchoring, but rather due to their 
usefulness in belief-revision of bargainers. 
The potential benefit of recommendations in ADR procedures is significant, especially 
given the relative ease with which any binding settlement procedure could be amended to allow 
for a preliminary recommendation.  As such, this research is also more general than existing 
work that focuses on specific binding procedures.  If nonbinding recommendations can increase 
voluntary settlement rates—generally considered a measure of ADR success—this could help 
minimize the costly use of litigation, binding arbitration, and legislatures in determining 
settlements.  To the extent that voluntary settlements are considered more efficient than 
mandated settlements (see Crawford, 1979), this would also improve the efficiency of bargaining 
outcomes in many contexts.   
2.  Theoretical Framework 
 The model is an extension of Farber and Katz (1979) that incorporates a fact finder and 
also utilizes a “sophisticated” arbitrator similar to that used by Farber (1981).  We model a 
nonstrategic arbitrator in a framework that is is not specific to arbitration--any binding decision 
authority (e.g., courts, legislative bodies) could be modeled in the same way.  Consider two 
bargainers B and S engaged in zero-sum bargaining over one dollar (or any fixed amount of 
                                                 
5 A separate strand of experimental economics research is starting to identify the potentially important effects of 
“advice” on behavior and outcome efficiency (e.g., Schotter, 2003:  Schotter and Sopher, 2007).  These emerging 
studies of intergenerational games are innovative but quite distinct from our interests.  The recommendations that we 
consider are not passed down from a previous generation of players, and our recommenders do not have a financial 
interest in the bargaining outcomes—in fact, we mechanize the implementation of recommendations as random 
draws from a settlement distribution.  The recommendations we examine therefore come from a disinterested third-
party, which is modeled after neutral ADR agents who have no authority to issue binding settlements. 
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money).  For simplicity, we will often refer to bargainer B (S) as the buyer (seller).  Bargainer 
utility depends on risk preferences, c, and the fraction of the “pie” received: 
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where y is the amount player S receives, and z=1-y is the amount that player B receives.  Utility 
increases in the fraction of the dollar received, with U(0)=0 and U(1)=1.  Risk preferences are 
defined solely by -ci for i=b,s, the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion (see Farber and 
Katz, 1979).  As such, player i is risk-averse (loving) when ci < (>) 0.    
  Bargaining impasse is ultimately settled by a binding decision-maker known here as the 
arbitrator.  Bargainers are uncertain about the settlement preferences, D, of the arbitrator, and 
this uncertainty is modeled by assuming bargainers know the distribution function from which 
settlements are drawn.  Let yiF and i2, for i=b,s, be the bargainer’s expectation of the mean and 
variance of the arbitrator’s preference over the amount the seller receives.  Experimental and 
field evidence suggests that bargainers are optimistic with respect to likely outcomes from 
arbitration6, which implies that ybF will be less than, and ysF greater than the actual mean of the 
arbitrator’s preferences.  Farber and Katz (1979) examine the contract zone—the region of 
settlements both bargainers prefer over arbitration—assuming that the settlement is a random 
draw, D, from the distribution of the arbitrator’s preferred settlements.   
 Now suppose that a recommendation, R, is given to bargainers prior to declaration of 
impasse.  The recommendation is nonbinding, but bargainers are aware that the arbitrator’s 
binding settlement includes a weight,  ]1,0[  placed on the recommendation.  Dickinson and 
Hunnicutt (2005) show that a non-binding recommendation reduces the size of this contract zone 
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both before and after the recommendation is given, under what we will call “naïve” arbitration, 
in which the arbitrator ignores (or does not know) the bargainers’ final offers.  This naïve 
framework seems unrealistic, as the arbitrator is assumed to know and consider one piece of 
information (the recommendation), but not others (the final positions).   
 In contrast, we consider a sophisticated arbitrator who weights both the recommendation 
and the midpoint of the bargainers’ final offers, xb for the buyer and xs for the seller, in his 
settlement choice.  Specifically, final settlement awarded to the seller is now 
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 ,  and  is the size of the total bargaining range.7  This  captures the intuition 
of Farber (1981) in that the arbitrator places increasingly more weight on the bargainers’ final 
offers the more they converge (as  approaches zero, the weight on the final offers approaches 
one).  Alternatively, the farther apart are the final offers—in this case  approaches 1—the more 
the arbitrator ignores the final offers.  The idea is that bargainers who are “close” to agreement 
ought to have a settlement that reflects their stated preferences (offers), while offers that diverge 
suggest that settlement is unlikely and final offers are less informative.8 
                                                                                                                                                             
6 See, for example, Babcock and Loewenstein (1997) and Dickinson (2006). 
7 In the experiments described below, we restrict the buyer to offering the smallest value of the bargaining range or 
more and the seller to offering the largest value of the bargaining range or less.  While it is possible that an 
especially aggravated buyer might offer even less than the lowest value of the bargaining range as a signal of his or 
her displeasure, this sort of behavior will not be considered in theory nor in the experiments.  We also rule out the 
possibility that  is negative, since this means the seller would accept less than the buyer is willing to pay, which 
implies that an agreement will have been reached.  Thus,  is bounded between zero and one. 
8 It would be possible to consider bargainer strategy in choice of final offer (following Farber, 1981).  Indeed, 
optimizing the award by choice of final offers yields optimal final offers of ))1((
2
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This formulation allows us to consider cases where the recommendation exists but is 
completely ignored (as well as cases where the arbitrator completely ignores her own 
preferences in deciding the final outcome (We focus on the more interesting case of < 1. 
There is empirical evidence that recommendations, such as those given by formal fact-finders, 
can have widely varied effects () on binding settlement procedure outcomes (see Karper, 1994).  
As long as some positive weight is placed on the recommendation (i.e., 0 < < 1), uncertainty 
surrounding arbitration is reduced but not removed by the recommendation.  If uncertainty 
encourages risk-averse bargainers to settle, then a recommendation may be counterproductive for 
voluntary settlement.  Ashenfelter et al. (1992) and Babcock and Taylor (1996) report laboratory 
evidence confirming that, ceteris paribus, decreased outcome uncertainty increases dispute rates.  
On the other hand, because the recommendation reduces the size of the contract zone, it also 
gives the bargainers less over which to dispute, thereby reducing the number of potential 
equilibria. Further, the recommendation may (through updating of beliefs) lead to more accurate 
bargainer expectations and/or convergent final offers.  Thus, the recommendation could improve 
settlement rates.   
Finally, it is also possible to consider bargaining situations in which no recommendation 
exists.  In this case, the arbitrator, having no recommendation to consider, would award the seller 
a weighted average of final offers and the arbitrator’s own preferences, 
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the arbitrator, who in this case is influenced by the suggestion.  
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situations in which the recommendation is ignored (γ=0) and those in which it fails to exist.  This 
fact will enable us to test the focal nature of the recommendation, as its presence, even when 
completely ignored, may affect settlement rates through its influence on bargainer optimism. 
 The boundaries of the contract zone are defined by the certainty equivalent of each 
bargainer, or the minimum (maximum) amount that the seller (buyer) would be willing to accept 
(pay) to avoid the uncertainty of arbitration.  Our theoretical framework assumes that the focal 
point effect comes mainly through its direct effect on bargainer beliefs, although bargainer final 
offers may also be affected by recommendations.  We show in Appendix A that the size of the 
contract zone, , of mutually acceptable outcomes is given by  
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This reduces to the Dickinson and Hunnicutt (2005) post-recommendation contract zone when 
(the arbitrator ignores final offers), and to the Farber and Katz (1979) contract zone when 
both andthe arbitrator ignores – or is unaware of – the recommendation).  The 
uncertainty effect of recommendations occurs through the second term in (2), where any 
recommendation given weight (will reduce the size of the contract zone for risk averse 
bargainers, ceteris paribus.9 
With optimistic expectations, sFbF yy  , and the first term in (2) is negative.  Assuming 
that bargainers are on average risk averse, 0)( 22  ssbb cc  , the second term is positive.
10  It 
                                                 
9 This is a formal statement of how recommendations can actually damage prospects for voluntary settlement, as has 
been suggested “….., in order to preserve the uncertainty surrounding the arbitration process and to encourage real 
bargaining, allowing the arbitrator to act as a mediator and other mechanisms that provide flows of information from 
the arbitrator to the parties will be counterproductive.”  Farber and Katz (1979), p. 63 (emphasis added). 
10We consider joint risk aversion a reasonable assumption. This assumption is supported by data in Holt and Laury 
(2002), who find that experimental subjects responding to non-hypothetical lottery questions are typically risk 
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is therefore possible (given optimistic expectations) that the contract zone fails to exist even for 
risk averse bargainers, since optimism may outweigh risk aversion.  In this case, the most the 
buyer is willing to pay is less than the least the seller would accept.  In such instances, a 
settlement after the recommendation is attributable to the influence the recommendation has on 
bargainer optimism.11 
3.  Focal Point Effects of Recommendations 
Dickinson and Hunnicutt (2005) show that the presence of the recommendation reduces 
bargainer uncertainty and therefore shrinks the contract zone.  Following one branch of the 
literature, they further claim that a smaller contract zone will “chill” bargaining and thus make 
negotiated agreements less likely.  However, their empirical results suggest that the 
recommendation has the opposite effect, in that it significantly increases the likelihood of 
negotiated settlement.  They claim that this result is due to the focal nature of the 
recommendation, although their theoretical model does not formalize a focal point effect. 
 While not the main focus of our paper, it is interesting to consider what features of the 
recommendation, R, make it a focal point.  According to Bacharach and Bernasconi (1997), an 
outcome is “salient” if it is unique, obvious to both parties, and commonly known.12  Both in 
theory and in our experiments, the recommendation may be one of many focal points (the mid-
                                                                                                                                                             
averse, even over “normal” laboratory payoffs.  The assumption of risk aversion also seems realistic in application 
to real-world negotiations.  Though risk preferences were not measured here, Dickinson (2005), using the same 
general student subject pool, finds both Players B and S to be slightly risk averse.  Many of these results would be 
reversed if bargainers are risk-loving, but the laboratory data do not support this hypothesis. 
11 The existing literature is not in complete agreement over the effect of uncertainty and contract zone size on 
dispute rates.  While some argue that larger contract zones imply lower dispute rates (e.g., Crawford, 1982; Farber 
and Bazerman, 1987), others argue that larger contract zone imply that there is more over which to dispute, thereby 
increasing dispute rates (e.g., Tracy, 1986, 1987; Crampton, 1992).  Our model allows for both possibilities, 
although, consistent with the results in Ashenfelter et al. (1992), we maintain the position that lower dispute rates 
should follow from larger contract zones, ceteris paribus.   
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point of the bargaining range is another candidate).  Our key point is that the obvious and unique 
nature of the recommendation (both in theory and in the experiments) grants it special status 
(salience).  While other focal points may be present in the bargaining experiments (although the 
experimental design is set to minimize their presence), our work tests whether the addition of the 
recommendation (a new and possibly different focal point) influences bargaining.   
The focal point effect can be formalized by considering the influence of the 
recommendation on bargainer beliefs about the arbitrator’s preferences.  Several papers have 
demonstrated that bargainers tend to have optimistic or self-serving beliefs in bargaining 
situations, both in similar laboratory settings (Dickinson, 2005 and 2006) and in naturally 
occurring settings (see Babcock and Loewenstein, 1997).  Within this model, optimism with 
respect to the arbitrator’s preferences translates to sFDbF yy   , where D  is the true mean of 
the arbitrator’s settlement preferences.  Given optimism, the buyer and seller have divergent 
beliefs as to what the arbitrator considers is a fair settlement, so that 0 sFbF yy .  This makes 
the contract zone smaller than it would be if bargainers had perfectly rational assumptions about 
the arbitrator. 
When a recommendation is given weight in the final settlement (i.e., our 
framework implies an enlarging of the contract zone for optimistic bargainers through the first 
term in (2).  However, our proposed focal point mechanism assumes that bargainers update their 
beliefs about the arbitrator once they have received a recommendation—after all, bargainers are 
aware that the recommendation is drawn from the same distribution as the arbitrator’s notion of a 
                                                                                                                                                             
12 We do not further explore in this paper the mechanism by which recommendations may serve as focal points, 
although  existing research has made progress in this area (see, for example, Janssen, 2001; Bacharach and 
Bernasconi, 1997; and Sugden, 1995). 
  11
fair settlement.  In particular, let )( RERyy iiFiF  , where i=b,s and RER i  is the distance 
between the actual recommendation, R, and what bargainer i expected the recommendation to be, 
EiR.  Further suppose that 0iFy , and 0iFy .  If both parties are optimistic, then they expect 
the recommendation to be closer to their preferred position than it will actually be.  That is, for 
the buyer 0 RER b , while the opposite will be true for the seller.  Thus, a recommendation 
that is close to the actual mean of the fact-finder/arbitrator distribution will help correct buyer 
and seller optimism, and pull ybF and ysF closer together, which directly ameliorates the negative 
effect of optimism on the contract zone.  If the recommendation is focal, it therefore reduces 
optimism, and directly enlarges the contract zone.  One may also assume that a recommendation 
serves as a simple psychological anchor.  Our experimental design is set up to be able to 
discriminate between the hypotheses of anchoring versus belief updating, because we also 
include recommendations within a “no arbitration” environment, where there is no opportunity 
for belief revision.  If recommendations still lower dispute rates, even when the impasse outcome 
is known with certainty, then such would be evidence for simple anchoring.   
Recommendations may also have an indirect effect on the contract zone, through their 
influence on bargainer final offers and the sophisticated arbitrator.  If final offers converge due to 
a recommendation, then this reinforces the dichotomy that our framework highlights.  
Convergent final offers reduce the size of the sophisticated arbitrator weight , which reduces the 
impact of bargainer optimism thereby enlarging the contract zone (the first term in equation 2 
above) while also reducing the uncertainty effects of arbitration, thereby shrinking the contract 
zone (the second term in equation 2).  The added complication of these indirect effects does not 
substantially add to our theoretical framework, though the data will show that final bargaining 
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positions do appear to converge towards a recommendation.  This serves to highlight the 
robustness of the model’s predictions with respect to the focal point effect, as even with apparent 
indirect effects, settlement is generally more frequent with a recommendation.13 
4.  Experimental Environment 
We generate data from a controlled laboratory bargaining environment to empirically 
examine the effects of focal points and outcome uncertainty.  The experiment uses a computer 
interface to randomly and anonymously match subjects—disputant B (the buyer) and disputant S 
(the seller)—with the same anonymous counterpart for twenty 3-minute rounds, with subjects 
bargaining over the value of a variable, x.14  Payoff information is private, but subjects are aware 
that counterpart earnings move opposite own-earnings (i.e., win-loss bargaining as assumed in 
Section 2).  Thus, subjects are aware that their own gain is their counterpart’s loss, and private 
payoff level information simulates the real world asymmetry that exists in assessing the value 
your bargaining counterpart places on the object of negotiations.  Given this, our environment is 
one in which the exact size of the contract zone is uncertain.15  The disputants bargain in each 
round over a $2.00 pie, which (unknown to the disputants) would be equally split at x=500.  
Dollar payoffs for disputant B are given by PB(x)=1.00+.005*(500-x).  For disputant S, payoffs 
                                                 
13 Suppose that a recommendation is “extreme” in the sense that it is above (below) the seller’s (buyer’s) prior belief 
yF.  In this case, recommendations will still cause beliefs to converge if we assume that the adjustment in beliefs is 
greatest for the party whose prior belief was farthest from the recommendation. 
14The experimental environment is motivated by the design of Ashenfelter et al (1992), and is an extension of the 
bargaining-with-arbitration application used in Dickinson (2004). 
15 Additionally, subjects may not make offers outside of their bargaining range.  Disputant B is instructed to bargain 
for x between 200 and 700, and disputant S for x between 300 and 800.  The theoretical predictions are silent as to 
the effects of this detail, but it is meant to improve the validity of the data since real-world bargainers would likely 
not have full information on their counterpart’s target range.  Further, asymmetric ranges should help avoid the 50-
50 split focal point (an issue mentioned in Ashenfelter et al., 1992, though they deal with it in a different way). 
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are given by PS(x)=1.00+.005*(x-500).  This private payoff information is presented to the 
subjects by means of payoff tables. 
The experiment does not allow communication other than the numeric messages 
transmitted through the subjects’ computer terminals.  The bargaining environment is relatively 
unstructured.  Offers can be exchanged freely, and there is no requirement that offers must 
“improve” upon previous offers, or that there be counteroffers, or that there be any offer at all.  
The most recent offer of either disputant is displayed at the top of the offer queue, and either 
disputant can accept his/her counterpart’s standing offer at any time.   
Subjects proceed at their own pace through on-screen instructions that explain in detail 
all aspects of the experimental bargaining environment.  Sample bargaining screens are 
displayed to the subjects in the general instructions to highlight important details (instructions 
available on request).  Across all experiment groups we utilized eight different dispute resolution 
treatments:  NA, NAsugg, CAnaive, CAsoph, CAsugg(0), CAsugg(.20), CAsugg(.50), and 
CAsugg(.80).  The “sugg” treatments are those that implement a recommendation or 
“suggestion”.  The design is a combination of a within- and across-subjects design, because each 
group of subjects participates in four of the eight distinct treatments over the course of a 20-
round experiment (5 rounds of each treatment).16   
In the NA (No Arbitration) treatment subjects are allowed to bargain for the entire 3-
minute round, and should they reach the end of the round without agreeing on the value of x, 
payoffs to both bargainers are zero.  NAsugg is similar except that a nonbinding suggestion is 
                                                 
16Subjects were unaware that 5 rounds of each treatment would be completed, which helps control for strategic play 
across multiple rounds.  Also the specific ordering of the treatments was varied for different bargaining pairs 
(although each treatment consisted of five consecutive rounds) - this was to control for potential ordering effects. 
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given halfway through the round (at 1.5 minutes). CAnaive and CAsoph are conventional 
arbitration (CA) treatments that do not provide a suggestion, but rather let subjects bargain for 
the entire 3 minutes prior to implementing a settlement.  This settlement is a draw from a normal 
N(500,60) distribution of potential arbitrator settlements.  Subjects receive prior information on 
the computer “decision-maker” by viewing a table of 100 previous draws from the distribution in 
the instructions (see Ashenfelter et al., 1992, for the use and justification of this form of 
mechanizing the arbitrator for experimental purposes), along with viewing the density function 
and being given information on central tendencies from the distribution.  Though we do not 
generate direct data on bargainer expectations, we are confident that bargainers are still 
optimistic, even with such information.  In related research, bargainers are statistically 
significantly optimistic when asked to report expectations on yF in the same experimental 
bargaining-with-arbitration environment ( 516 ,484  sFbF yy , reported in Dickinson (2004), 
and available on request).17   
The CAnaive arbitrator implements a random draw from the arbitrator distribution as the 
binding settlement, whereas the CAsoph treatment weights the bargainers’ final offers as per 
equation (1), though without a suggestion.The various CAsugg treatments implement 
settlements based on equation (1) (with 0 ), and the number in parenthesis refers to the 
gamma-weighting of the suggestion.  In these treatments, a suggestion was given halfway 
through each round (at 1.5 minutes).  In all treatments with a suggestion, recommendations were 
draws from the same N(500,60) distribution as for the arbitrator, and subjects were given the 
                                                 
17 Dickinson (2004), finds that additional information on the arbitrator distribution reduces optimism, but a 
significant amount remains nonetheless.  Because this additional information includes the mean of the arbitrator 
distribution, which was originally intended to remove all optimism, one might hypothesize that subjects were 
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same information on the computer “suggestor” distribution as they were given for the computer 
arbitrator.  The use of the exact same distribution for both the suggestion and arbitrator 
settlement preferences parallels the real world in the sense that arbitrators, mediators, and fact-
finders often come from the same pool of neutral dispute resolution agents in the field.  In all 
treatments subjects were allowed to submit final offers at impasse, and the binding settlement 
was only implemented if final offers were still in disagreement (i.e., xb < xs).  
In utilizing an anonymous, no-communication experiment, we trade off some external 
validity (i.e., real world parallelism) for a higher level of internal control in our experiments.  
This approach is meant to address the main weakness of field data on negotiations and dispute 
settlement—the lack of comparability of data across dispute resolution conditions.  While the 
external validity of laboratory bargaining data may be a concern, there is precedence in the 
literature supporting the usefulness of experiments when subjects are economically motivated, as 
ours are (see Bolton and Katok, 1998; Roth et al., 1988).  Finally, we must address certain data 
issues given that our subjects are matched as bargaining counterparts for the entire 20-round 
experiment.  As a result, the econometric analysis of the data controls for potentially 
interdependent error terms for a given subject-pair across rounds, and it also controls for the 
bargaining history of the subject-pair to address the concern of subject-learning. 
5.  Results 
We report results from 77 bargaining pairs, each completing a 20-round experiment.  
Subjects earned, on average, $20 for participation in the 90-minute experiment.  Summary data 
on dispute rates and arbitrated settlement (for the subset of disputed rounds within a treatment) 
                                                                                                                                                             
provided too much information to process (or they did not understand the statistical information provided).  In such 
cases it is reasonable to think that subjects form beliefs that display typical self-serving biases. 
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are shown in Table 1.  Relative to destroying the pie (NA), dispute rates rise with arbitration of 
any sort, which is not surprising given our use of zero monetary cost arbitration—our focus is on 
uncertainty costs of arbitration as highlighted in Stevens (1966).  Relative to the naïve arbitrator, 
the sophisticated arbitrator treatment increases dispute rates, which is what we predict for risk 
averse bargainers given that outcome uncertainty is reduced when final offers are known to 
influence binding settlement outcomes.  A key result of this paper is that dispute rates fall when 
nonbinding recommendations precede arbitration.  The difference in dispute rates from CA soph 
to CA sugg(0) measures the pure treatment effect of adding recommendations, since the 
arbitrator’s decision, given by equation (1), is the same in either case, with the only difference 
being the recommendation (which the arbitrator ignores in CA sugg(0)).  We find no such effect 
when adding suggestions to NA, consistent with the hypothesis that recommendations help 
improve bargainer expectations of likely settlement outcomes, rather than serving as simple 
anchors.  In short, the recommendations appear to be effective in that they help bargainers update 
their beliefs about the arbitrator’s decision, rather than simply serving as anchors around which 
bargainers craft a settlement. 
Of course, Table 1 does not control for potential confounds in the aggregate data.  The 
controlled econometric results are summarized in Tables 2 and 3, which analyze the determinants 
of dispute rates, final bargaining positions, and settlement outcomes.  Though the computer 
application did not allow submission of offers outside one’s suggested bargaining range, it did 
allow a bargainer to agree to an offer outside of the bargaining range.  As such, a small number 
of observations are omitted from this analysis (40 out of 1540), leaving us with 1500 total rounds 
of bargaining data.   
5.1  Dispute Rates 
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Dispute rates are often considered the most important factor in evaluating the 
effectiveness of an ADR procedure.  Table 2 shows the results from a binomial probit model of 
dispute rates.  Here, we code Dispute=1 when the bargaining pair utilizes the dispute resolution 
mechanism in a given round.  If the pair agrees before the end of the round, or their final offers 
converge (such that sb xx  ), it is coded as a voluntary settlement (i.e., Dispute=0).  The model 
estimates treatment effects of the various dispute resolution procedures, as well as the effects of 
two bargaining experience variables, Round and Dispute History.  The variable Round takes on 
values between one and twenty, and measures the effect of the bargaining round, to control for 
learning or experience within the experiment.  Dispute History, which ranges from one to 
nineteen, is the cumulative previous number of disputes in which the pair has engaged, and 
accounts for pair-specific bargaining history.  We report the estimated marginal effects in Table 
2, and the covariance matrix is adjusted for data clustering by bargaining pair.  The clustering 
correction, along with the variables Round and Dispute History, help control for the likely effects 
of our fixed-pairs experiment design.  The model correctly predicts 77% of the dispute outcomes. 
In reviewing the treatment variable marginal effects it is clear that the use of arbitration 
significantly increases the likelihood of dispute relative to the NA treatments (the omitted 
treatment variable category is NA).  This is not surprising giving that arbitration reduces the 
direct monetary cost of dispute to zero.  Because our focus is not on monetary costs of dispute 
settlement procedures, we chose to implement zero-cost dispute settlement procedures in the 
lab.18  It is the difference across CA treatments that are of primary interest in this paper. 
                                                 
18 Others have already shown disputes to be inversely related to the monetary costs of an arbitration procedure 
(Ashenfelter et al., 1992), and so a fixed cost of arbitration would only parametrically shift the level of disputes.  We 
chose to simplify our design by omitting such direct monetary costs of arbitration/recommendations throughout.  
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Relative to the naïve arbitrator treatment (CAnaive), CAsoph increases the likelihood of 
dispute by a statistically insignificant amount (Wald test of the two coefficients, p=.47).  In 
comparing the suggestion treatments, the pattern of the estimated marginal effects indicates a 
peak in the marginal increase in dispute rate probability at CAsugg(.50).  The coefficient on 
CAsugg(.50) is significantly larger than the coefficient on CAsugg(0) (p=.06 for the Wald test) 
and the coefficient on CAsugg(.80) (p=.01).  
In comparing arbitration with a recommendation versus without, recall that CAsugg(0) is 
identical to CAsoph, except that CAsugg(0) includes a zero-weighted mid-round suggestion.  
Because the recommendation is completely ignored in CAsugg(0), it has no effect on the size of 
the contract zone through the parameter .19  This elimination of the influence of uncertainty and 
makes the comparison of CAsoph and CAsugg(0) a relatively pure test of the effectiveness of 
suggestions.  The marginal effect on CAsoph is significantly larger than the marginal effect on 
CAsugg(0) (Wald test, p=.06).  Thus, the parties are significantly more likely to dispute without a 
recommendation (when compared to NA – the baseline treatment) than they are when they 
receive a recommendation that the arbitrator subsequently ignores.  The mechanism we give in 
theory is that suggestions help correct the optimism of the average subject (i.e., belief revision).  
This hypothesis is supported more specifically by the result that suggestions do not significantly 
decrease the likelihood of dispute in NAsugg relative to NA.  Impasse outcomes are known with 
certainty in NA treatments, and there is no opportunity to revise beliefs about the likely impasse 
outcome in NAsugg.  Anchoring would still predict lower dispute rates in NAsugg than in NA, 
                                                                                                                                                             
The result is an increase in disputes with arbitration that certainly overstates what one would predict in a naturally 
occurring setting. 
19 In fact, if the suggestion is focal and influences bargainer expectations, then this actually expands the theoretical 
contract zone.   
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because final offers would move towards the anchor, but our results do not show this.   In sum, 
both the aggregate data averages and the controlled econometric analysis support the conclusion 
that suggestions made prior to a binding settlement procedure significantly increase settlement 
rates.   
Our results also indicate that when suggestions are used, settlement rates are highest 
when the suggestion is either weighted little or much.  There is no significant difference in the 
coefficients on CAsugg(0) and CAsugg(.80) (Wald test p=.27), but the significantly larger 
marginal effect on CAsugg(.50) indicates that subjects are more likely to dispute in this treatment 
compared to other CAsugg treatments.  We cannot explain this result within our existing 
theoretical framework.  We might only hypothesize that prior to the recommendation, the 
dispute outcome is least uncertain when an equally-weighted suggestion and arbitration 
preference are anticipated—a sort-of diversified portfolio argument of lowering dispute risk.  
This may tend to discourage early settlements for risk-averse bargainers, such that dispute rates 
might increase in CAsugg(.50) in spite of the beneficial effects of the recommendation once it is 
issued.  Not only are dispute rates highest in CAsugg(.50) (Table 1), but additional results on 
settlement timing (available on request) show the cumulative settlement frequency early in a 
bargaining round is lowest in CAsugg(.50) when compared to other CAsugg treatments.  This is 
roughly consistent with the notion that risk-averse bargainers want to avoid risk and choose to 
settle more quickly when a recommendation is to be weighted on one extreme or another.    
Finally, the Table 2 results also identify bargaining experience effects in Round and 
Dispute History.  Disputes are less likely the higher the round number, but more likely with each 
previous round of dispute history for the pair.  This result highlights the distinct effects of good 
versus bad history on dispute rates, and is consistent with prior research (Dickinson, 2004).  
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5.2  Bargaining positions and Settlement Values 
The first two columns of Table 3 show the results of a model of buyer and seller final 
bargaining positions.  Final offers generated at impasse are a measure of theoretical final offers, 
but our experimental bargaining program does not collect “final offer” data when agreement 
occurs prior to the end of the round.  For this reason, we code the final bargaining position to 
equal the final offer, when given at the end of the round, or the agreement x-value in the event 
that the subjects do not reach the end of the round due to settlement.   
Our theoretical model yields testable predictions in terms of the effects of a 
recommendation on final bargaining positions and settlement x-values.  We therefore estimate 
three models in Table 3:  Buyer and Seller final bargaining positions, and agreement x-value.  
For the model of agreement x-values, we restrict our attention to the subset of rounds in which a 
voluntary settlement occurred (N=1038), and we correct for sample selection for that model 
using the two-stage Heckit procedure with the first-stage probit regressors of Table 2.  
The independent variables in Table 3 are mostly similar to those in Table 2.  One 
important distinction is in the use of variables to identify the impact of the specific suggestion on 
final bargaining positions.  Past Mid-round is a dummy variable that equals one when bargainers 
make it past the mid-point (90 seconds) in a round.  Suggestion Value measures the effect of the 
specific suggestion on bargaining positions and settlement values, with a squared term included 
to allow for nonlinear effects.  The variable is interacted with the NA treatment to again assess 
the effects of suggestions on bargaining with arbitration versus without. 
Another main result of this paper is that final bargaining positions and settlement 
(agreement) x-values are all positively related to suggestions.  The pattern of coefficient 
estimates indicate a relationship shown in Figure 1—for the range of suggestions in our 
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experiments, the data lie on the upward sloping portion of the estimated quadratic relationship.   
This result is consistent with our modeling of focal suggestions.  If suggestions are focal and, 
through expectations, alter the location of the contract zone, then one would predict that 
agreement x-values would be positively related to suggestions.  This is precisely what we 
estimate in Table 3, when considering both the linear and squared terms on Suggestion value for 
the relevant range of suggestions (i.e., 200<R<800).  Of course, this result is also consistent with 
an anchoring hypothesis of suggestions, but the interactive terms indicate behavior consistent 
with anchoring only among the buyers.  That is, buyers’ final bargaining positions are influenced 
by suggestions no differently in NA treatments than in CAsugg treatments. 
In the buyer and seller equations in Table 3, there is some evidence that final bargaining 
positions are more highly divergent in CAnaive and CAsoph compared to when suggestions are 
used in CAsugg treatments, due mainly to the buyer (Player B).20  One can further evaluate this 
result by examining the variance of arbitrated outcomes in the CAsugg treatments, which should 
be consequently lower.  The Table 3 results should then imply a larger variance of arbitration 
settlements when there is no suggestion. Table 1 shows arbitration settlement variance for each 
arbitration treatment.  Except for CAsugg(.50), the arbitration settlement variance is larger in 
NAnaive and NAsoph compared to the CAsugg treatments.  As noted before with dispute rates, it 
appears to be somewhat counterproductive to equally weight the recommendation and the 
arbitrator settlement preference.  Not only are dispute rates higher in CAsugg(.50), but the 
variance of the arbitrated settlements is higher as well. 
                                                 
20 Given that we use data from all voluntary settlement rounds and disputed rounds, our coding of final bargaining 
positions in the voluntary settlement rounds necessarily implies convergent final bargaining positions.  This may 
seem to bias our Table 3 results towards convergent final positions in CAsugg treatments due to their higher 
settlement rates.  The results are, however, unchanged if one considers only the subsample of data where the 
outcome is dispute. 
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This is an important secondary result, because a smaller variance of arbitrated settlements 
may be important for the procedure to be considered acceptable (see Farber, 1980).  In sum, with 
a sophisticated arbitrator, not only do recommendations lower dispute rates (Table 2), but in 
most cases they also reduce the variance of arbitration settlements by drawing offers together 
(Tables 1 and 3).  Finally, the estimated coefficients on Round and Dispute History are consistent 
with the Table 2 results.  They indicate that round experience brings bargainers together, while 
dispute history does the opposite.  In fact, one round of bad history (i.e., dispute) offsets the 
positive effects of over two rounds of general bargaining experience as measured by Round. 
The Agreement x-value model in Table 3 indicates that certain ADR treatments 
significantly increase settlement values, and that the general positive influence of suggestions 
does not apply in NA treatments.  The pattern of coefficients in the Agreement x-value tests is 
consistent with the hypothesis that the average buyer is more risk-averse than the average seller 
in our data.  Incidentally, our subjects responded to a hypothetical lottery question meant to elicit 
risk preferences prior to our experiments.  We do not consider their responses an accurate 
enough measure of risk preferences to include the variable in our formal analysis—subjects 
exhibited some confusion over the presentation of the lottery question—but average responses do 
indicate a slightly more risk-averse buyer than seller, on average.21  Buyers should then give 
away more to sellers in negotiated settlements when the ADR procedure is considered riskier, 
which may be the case with extreme weighted suggestions in the CAsugg treatments.  The 
predicted settlement values shown in Figure 1 are closer to predicted seller final bargaining 
positions than buyer final bargaining positions, which is also consistent with buyers being more 
                                                 
21 Dickinson (in press) implements the less-confusing Holt and Laury (2002) lottery choice task in the same 
bargaining-with-arbitration environment and he also finds that buyers are slightly more risk averse than sellers. 
  23
risk averse than sellers.  In short, the results from the Agreement x-value model in Table 3 are 
suggestive of bargaining power differences in our data, but a more detailed analysis can only be 
conducted with an experimental design that generates better measures of risk preferences.    
6.  Conclusion 
 Dispute resolution procedures are intended to improve voluntary settlement rates, and 
nonbinding procedures generally boast high settlement rates.  However, it is unclear from field 
data whether nonbinding procedures generate higher settlement rates for comparable disputes 
because binding procedures are often reserved for the most difficult disputes.  A hybrid 
procedure could include a nonbinding procedure followed by a binding procedure if needed, and 
this paper has examined the effectiveness of implementing a nonbinding suggestion prior to 
binding dispute settlement.  Such a procedure reflects important characteristics of real world 
dispute resolution, such as the use of a nonbinding recommendation prior to an arbitrated labor 
contract settlement, the use of parental input prior to resolving a sibling dispute, or the use of 
court-annexed mediation prior to a legal dispute proceeding to trial.  
 Theoretically, we analyze a model of sophisticated arbitrator decision-making that 
identifies the effects of recommendations on the bargaining contract zone.  Our experiments are 
design to discriminate between competing hypotheses regarding the general effects of 
suggestions.  Our results are consistent with the hypothesis that nonbinding suggestions improve 
bargaining outcomes, and the mechanism by which a recommendation may increase the 
bargainers’ contract zone is through reducing optimism following a recommendation. A second 
mechanism supported by our results is that recommendations influence final offers and reduce 
the variance in arbitrated settlements, further improving bargaining outcomes.  Dispute rates are 
significantly lower when a recommendation stage is included prior to arbitration, even when the 
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recommendation is given no weight in the final arbitrated settlement.  The most effective 
procedures at reducing dispute rates are those that weight recommendations by a lot or a little in 
determining final binding outcomes, perhaps because equally-weighted recommendation and 
arbitrator preferences seems less risky, ex ante, and discourages early settlements. 
 We empirically examine the effects of recommendations on other bargaining outcomes as 
well, and find that final bargaining positions and voluntary settlement values are positively 
related to recommendations.  Because recommendations generally cause final bargaining 
positions to converge, relative to similar procedures with no suggestion, bargainers also retain 
more control over the outcome of an arbitrated settlement under our theoretical framework, and 
in our empirical results.  This is likely an important additional consideration in improving the 
acceptability of binding settlement outcomes, because procedures that generate highly variable 
arbitrated outcomes are not likely to be considered acceptable by disputants (Farber, 1980). 
 The implications of this research are significant given the large sums of dollars in dispute 
in a variety of industries.  Improved dispute resolution procedures can more efficiently allocate 
these amounts by increasing settlement rates, because voluntary settlements imply self-
determined outcomes by the bargainers.  There are also many informal settings in which 
nonbinding suggestions prior to mandated outcomes can lower dispute rates.  Long-term 
relationships are likely to be healthier when dispute rates are low among bargainers who 
repeatedly interact.  This research highlights the benefits that recommendations can have on 
improving bargaining outcomes, and these recommendations can be a simple and relatively 
inexpensive addition to any binding dispute resolution procedures.
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Table 1 
Mean and variance of arbitrated outcomes by treatment 
 Average Dispute 
Rate 
Mean of arbitrated 
settlements 
Variance of arbitrated 
settlements 
NA Naïve  
(N=390) 0.11 --- --- 
NA Suggestion 
(N=180) 0.11 --- --- 
CA Naïve 
(N=100) 0.40 504.41 3264.21 
CA Sophisticated 
(N=100) 0.50 498.68 2746.59 
CA sugg(0) 
(N=284) 0.36 494.93 2465.79 
CA sugg(20) 
(N=100) 0.42 500.95 1627.72 
CA sugg(50) 
(N=184) 0.43 481.53 3546.93 
CA sugg(80) 
(N=100) 0.37 495.88 1577.88 
 
 28 
 
TABLE 2 
Probit Model of Dispute Rates (MLE estimates) 
Dependent Variable=Dispute 
(marginal effects reported, calculated at the means of the X variables) 
 
Independent Variable Marginal Effect (p-value) 
Constant -.351 (.00)*** 
NAsugg                     .06 (.37) 
CAnaive .46 (.00)*** 
CAsoph .50 (.00)*** 
CAsugg(0) .41 (.00)*** 
CAsugg(.20) .42 (.00)*** 
CAsugg(.50) .50 (.00)*** 
CAsugg(.80) .35 (.00)*** 
Round -.03 (.00)*** 
Dispute History                    .07 (.00)***  
 
 
N=1500 
 
Model correctly predicts 
1160/1500 (77%) of outcomes 
*, **, *** indicates significance at the .10, .05, or .01 level, respectively,  
for the two-tailed test. 
The covariance matrix is adjusted for data clustering by bargaining pair. 
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TABLE 3:  Bargaining position and Agreement Value Models 
(OLS Estimates) 
                              
 
 
 
 
Variable 
 
Dependent Variable= 
Buyer Final 
Bargaining Position 
p-value in parenthesis
 
Dependent Variable= 
Seller Final 
Bargaining Position 
p-value in parenthesis
Dependent Variable= 
Agreement x-value 
p-value in parenthesis 
(corrected for sample 
selection) 
Constant     459.32 (.00)***    422.31 (.00)***    455.39 (.00)*** 
Past Mid-round     -29.85 (.00)***      37.30 (.00)*** 4.88 (.43) 
Suggestion -0.195 (.07)* -0.13 (.13)   -0.20 (.04)** 
Suggestion2 0.00039 (.06)*   0.00036 (.02)**     .00047 (.01)*** 
Suggestion*NAsugg          0.150 (.20)  0.09 (.29) 0.17 (.09)* 
Suggestion2*NAsugg       -0.0001 (.64)    -0.00034 (.05)**    -0.00035 (.07)* 
NAsugg  -4.31 (.87)     47.92 (.01)*** 7.67 (.07)* 
CAnaive      -56.82 (.00)***      51.11 (.00)***  .19 (.22) 
CAsoph      -46.67 (.00)***      63.92 (.00)***    51.39 (.01)*** 
CAsugg(0) 10.16 (.71)      56.67 (.01)***    56.93 (.00)*** 
CAsugg(.20)  9.42 (.77)      51.20 (.00)***   47.81 (.02)** 
CAsugg(.50) 35.96 (.19)      46.50 (.01)*** 39.13 (.09)* 
CAsugg(.80) 16.98 (.58)      60.97 (.00)***    56.15 (.00)*** 
Round         2.78 (.00)***      -1.71 (.00)***          -1.42 (.27) 
Dispute History         -6.54 (.01)***       8.86 (.00)***    6.56 (.02)** 
Lambda --- ---        -55.01 (.08)* 
  
N=1500 
Adjusted R2=.12 
 
N=1500 
Adjusted R2=.19 
 
N=1038 
Adjusted R2=.05 
*, **, *** indicates significance at the .10, .05, or .01 level, respectively,  
for the two-tailed test. 
The covariance matrices for the buyer and seller model are adjusting for data clustering by 
individual.  In the Agreement x-value model, a clustering adjustment is made on the first-stage 
probit selection equation. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
 To derive the size of the contract zone , we must first calculate each player’s certainty 
equivalent (the amount they would be willing to accept to avoid bargaining).  For Player S (the 
seller), this is calculated as follows: 
 
 Assume that final offers are not affected by the recommendation.  After bargaining, the 
seller expects to receive 
 
 sFsbs yR
xx
y )1(
2
)1(  




      (1a) 
where ysF reflects the seller’s beliefs about the arbitrator, and xb and xs are as defined in the 
text.  Since the arbitrator’s preferences are normally distributed, the seller’s beliefs are also 
normally distributed, with the mean as given in (1), and variance given by 222 )1( s   (
2
s  
represents the seller’s uncertainty about the arbitrator). 
 To calculate the seller’s certainty equivalent, we must find the seller’s certainty 
equivalent, ysC, which is the portion of the pie that gives player S the same utility as she expects 
to get from the bargaining/arbitration process.  That is, we must solve the following equation 
Us(ysC)=EUs 
where  
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 Recall that the moment generating function for a random variable x is given by 

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 dxxftxtM )()exp()( .  Letting y=x and cs=t, we see that we can rewrite expected utility as  
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 Finally, for a normally distributed random variable x, 
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deriving player S’s certainty equivalent comes down to solving the equation 
 





 












 
2
)1(
])1([
2
)1(exp)exp(
2222 
 sssF
sb
ssCs
c
yR
xx
cyc  
 It is straightforward to show that  
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 The same steps may be followed for the buyer, and we find that her certainty equivalent, 
ybC, is given by  
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 Finally, the contract zone is defined as the difference between the most the buyer would 
pay to avoid arbitration and the least the seller would accept to avoid arbitration.  This turns out 
to be 
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as noted in equation (2) the text. 
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APPENDIX B:  Experimental Instructions (NOT MEANT FOR PUBLICATION) 
  
Note:  Screen-shots (cut and pasted) of the subjects’ on-screen instructions are shown below for 
the General Instructions for player A (the buyer)—Player B instructions differ by replacing 
Player A with “Player B”, and Player B is instructed to bargain within the possible X-value range 
of 300 to 800, with higher earnings for larger values of X.  Treatment-specific additional 
instructions—which always followed general instructions at beginning of experiment—are 
shown for, CAsoph and CAsugg(.20).  Appropriate alterations in instructions occur for 
describing remaining treatments to subjects.  
************************************************************************** 
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS—PLAYER A 
[page change of on-screen computer instructions noted below] 
 
 
[new page] 
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[new page] 
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[new page] 
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[new page] 
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[new page] 
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[new page] 
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[new page] 
 
 
[new page] 
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[new page] 
 
 
 
Treatment Specific Instructions for CAsoph 
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Treatment Specific Instructions for CAsugg(.20) 
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[new page] 
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